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ABSTRACT 
Fake websites have emerged as a major source of online 
fraud, accounting for billions of dollars of loss by Internet 
users.  We explore the process by which salient design 
elements could increase the use of protective tools, thus 
reducing the success rate of fake websites. Using the 
protection motivation theory, we conceptualize a model to 
investigate how salient design elements of detection tools 
could influence users’ perceptions of the tools, efficacy in 
dealing with threats, and use of such tools.  The research 
method was a controlled lab experiment with a novel and 
extensive experimental design and protocol. We found 
that trust in the detector is the pivotal coping mechanism 
in dealing with security threats and is a major conduit for 
transforming salient design elements into increased use.  
We also found that design elements have profound and 
unexpected impacts on self-efficacy.  The significant 
theoretical and empirical implications of findings are 
discussed.   
Keywords 
protection motivation theory, experimental design, 
spoofed websites, concocted websites, detection tool, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fake websites generate billions of dollars in fraudulent 
revenue by exploiting human vulnerabilities in online 
settings and are estimated to comprise nearly 20% of the 
Web (Abbasi et al. 2010; Gyongyi and Garcia-Molina 
2005). Fake websites are a type of semantic attack in 
which attackers use meaningful content to semantically 
exploit weaknesses in human nature. Semantic attacks 
focus on “targeting the people” instead of exploiting 
hardware and software vulnerabilities as done by many 
other Internet security attacks, such as viruses, denial of 
service, and malware (Schneier 2000).  Users play 
security-critical roles in that security failures could result 
not only from attacks but also from unpredictable human 
behaviors (Cranor 2008).  The use of detection tools is the 
most important objective in the design of such tools since 
a tool that is turned off has no value in protecting users.  
To this end, we use a user-centered approach in which the 
relations between the critical design elements and actual 
use are investigated.  
There has been little research on how salient design 
elements of protective IT artifacts could influence users’ 
security perceptions and actual use. Previous studies (e.g. 
Wu et al. 2006) have been exploratory, and provided few 
theoretical insights regarding individuals’ reactions.  This 
paper is among the first to investigate the critical design 
elements of detection tools that could influence people’s 
use of such tools by asking the specific research 
questions. What are the salient design elements of fake 
website detection tools that most impact users’ security 
perceptions and promote use?  What is the process by 
which the design elements alter users’ behaviors? 
In formulating the conceptual model to address the 
research questions, we draw on the protection motivation 
theory (PMT) (Rogers 1983).  A novel experimental 
design, with extensive stimuli development using 
carefully identified spoofed and concocted websites, 
guided the data collection for this study.  Our research 
uncovers the process by which the salient design elements 
of fake website detection tools enhance users’ coping 
mechanism and increase the actual use of such tools.   
This paper makes important and novel theoretical and 
empirical contributions.  Our work shows how detection 
tools’ design elements must be enhanced and marketed to 
promote their use. We found trust in the detector is the 
pivotal coping mechanism in dealing with security threats 
posed by fake websites and is a major conduit for 
transforming users’ perceptions of design elements into 
their increased use of such tools. Elements that boost 
users’ trust are critical factors in the design of detection 
tools.  We also found that design elements have profound 
and unexpected impacts on users’ self-efficacy, which 
indicates the potential presence of an ego-enhancing role 
for protective IT artifacts.  Accuracy emerged as the most 
important design element that impacted trust in the tool, 
and its actual use.  Our work shows how this primary 
feature of the tool operates on users’ psychological 
mechanisms to change their perceptions and behaviors. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT  
To identify the salient design elements for fake website 
detection tools and understand user reactions to such 
tools, we need to look into users’ cognitive process of 
detecting deceptions when such tools are in the place. 
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According to the fraud deception theory (FDT), a 
deception involves two parties with conflicting interests, a 
deceiver and a target. The deceiver uses deceptive tactics 
to manipulate and misrepresent cues of a situation which 
depart from the truth, to induce a misjudgment by the 
target. The target, therefore will behave in accordance 
with the deceiver’s manipulations and misrepresentations 
(Johnson et al. 2001). To successfully detect deceptions, 
individuals need to detect the inconsistencies between the 
cues manipulated and the truth. The FDT suggests a fraud 
detection method based on the competence model of 
successful detections that can assist an individual’s 
cognitive process of fraud detection. Effective fake 
detection tools need to facilitate individual’s cognitive 
process in arousing suspicion(s) about abnormalities, 
generating and evaluating hypotheses on deceptions, and 
reaching a conclusion on the legitimacy of a site (Johnson 
et al. 2001). Two broad categories of design element can 
facilitate such cognitive process, performance elements 
and user interface elements of detection tools. 
Performance elements play a critical role in activating 
users’ fraud detection cognitive process before they fall 
into deceiver’s manipulations; user interface elements 
communicate the findings of the tool and help users detect 
manipulated and misrepresented cues and then heed the 
tool’s warnings. This paper is part of a larger federally-
funded research project that investigates both 
performance design and user-interface design of fake 
website-detection tools.  In this paper, we report on the 
performance-related design elements of such tools.  (The 
research on the user-interface elements of detection tools 
is currently underway.)  Based on the literature and the 
FDT theory, we have identified four categories of salient 
design elements, detector’ accuracy and run time, cost of 
detector error, type of threat (spoofed and concocted), and 
domain. 
Self-Protective Behavior Research 
There are theories for explaining how individuals can be 
motivated to protect themselves from harm. Protection 
motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers 1983) is the most well-
known in security research and has demonstrated 
significant explanatory power in predicting security 
behaviors (e.g. Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Chen and 
Zahedi 2009; Johnson and Warkentin 2010). PMT posits 
that humans’ protective behaviors involve two cognitive 
processes—threat appraisal and coping appraisal. The 
principal variables in the threat appraisal process are the 
perceived susceptibility to the threat (a perception about 
the extent of vulnerability to the threat) and the perceived 
severity of the threat (a perception about the magnitude of 
possible harm of the threat if no countermeasures are 
taken).  The primary constructs in the coping appraisal 
process are response efficacy (a belief in the effectiveness 
of the countermeasure), self-efficacy (a belief in one’s 
own ability in taking the countermeasure), and perceived 
cost of adoption (a perception about the amount of effort, 
time, and money needed for adopting the countermeasure) 
(Rogers 1983). PMT proposes that when individuals 
appraise the threat by assessing the susceptibility to and 
severity of the threat, and are confident in their coping 
ability (in terms of response efficacy, self-efficacy, and 
coping cost), they tend to take protective action against 
the threat.   
Model and Hypotheses Development 
In order to investigate the impact of the salient design 
elements, we propose the detection tool impact (DTI) 
model, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Detector Tool Impact (DTI) Model 
This is a user-centric assessment of how the detection tool 
design could change the usage of the system.  In this 
model, the manipulations of design elements form users’ 
perceptions of the detector, which in turn impact users’ 
cognitive processes—threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal and then actual use of the tool. The arguments 
for model conceptualization were not included here due to 
the space limitation.  The model hypotheses are reported 
below. 
H1. Users’ perceived loss due to detector error is 
positively associated with their perceived threat 
susceptibility. 
H2. Users’ perceived loss due to detector error is 
positively associated with their perceived threat severity. 
H3. Perceived loss due to detector error is negatively 
associated with users’ self-efficacy in dealing with fake 
website threats. 
H4. Detector effort requirement is negatively associated 
with users’ self-efficacy in dealing with fake website 
threats. 
H5. Detector usefulness is positively associated with 
users’ self-efficacy in dealing with fake website threats.  
H6. Perceived loss due to detector error will have a 
negative effect on users’ trust in the detector.  
H7. Detector usefulness is positively associated with 
users’ trust in the detector.  
H8. Users’ perceived threat susceptibility is positively 
associated with the extent of their detector use. 
H9. Users’ perceived threat severity is positively 
associated with the extent of their detector use. 
H10. Users’ perceived self-efficacy is positively 
associated with the extent of their detector use. 
H11. Users’ trust in the detector is positively associated 
with the extent of their detector use.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology was controlled lab experiment.  
We chose this methodology in order to examine the actual 
behaviors of individuals in using the detector.  The 
experimental design was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2=16 full-factorial 
design. The detection tool (DT) stimuli varied in design 
elements: accuracy, run time, type of threat, and loss due 
to detection error. Each design element had two levels: 
the DT accuracy was high vs. low (90% vs. 60%), the 
detection run time was fast vs. slow (1 vs. 4 seconds), the 
type of threat was either spoofed or concocted, the loss 
due to the detection error was high vs. low ($10 vs. $1).  
The values of all manipulations were determined by the 
suggestions from literature (e.g. Abbasi et al. 2010).  
The experimental protocol was to mimic real conditions 
of use.  We chose the sensitive context of online 
pharmacy.  An inventory of 15 spoofed, 15 concocted, 
and 15 legitimate online pharmacies was identified. A 
detection tool simulated the performance of fake website-
detection based on one of the 16 possible designs.  The 
designs were randomly assigned to the participants. The 
participants were randomly assigned 5 legitimate and 5 
fake (either spoofed or concocted) websites.  The 
experimental task was to buy an over-the-counter drug 
with a value of about $30 (Rogaine, a hair regrowth 
product, for grandpa). This product was chosen because it 
is relevant and familiar. For each website, the participants 
had to decide if they would visit the website, and once on 
the website, the participants had to decide if they would 
explore the website to find the product and, once found, if 
they would buy the product. Incentives and/or 
disincentives are also important factors to motivate 
human beings to take the proper security actions when 
they are in the security loop (Cranor 2008).  The 
participants were therefore awarded based on their 
performance. The final performance score for each 
participant was computed based on all their decisions 
regarding 10 assigned websites.  Payments were made in 
cash (gift card) or course credits based on each 
participant’s preference. The participants took an online 
survey before and after the experiment.   
All the scales for the study were also adopted from 
literature and modified for the current study. All items 
were converted to have semantic differential scales to 
ensure content validity and reduction of the threat of 
common method variance (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The 
instrument and corresponding references were not 
included due to space limitations. 
The experiment protocol and the instrument were 
pretested and pilot-tested. 437 participants from students 
in undergraduate and graduate programs in a large 
Midwestern university participated in the experiment. 
Average age of participants was 22.4 years, with 64% 
male and 36% female.   
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In the post-experiment survey, participants were asked to 
assess the detection time and accuracy and the cost of 
making one wrong decision, which we manipulated 
during the experiment, based on what they had 
experienced in the experiment. The results of the 
ANOVA tests supported the success of manipulation.   
We carried out exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to 
check the convergent and discriminant validity of the 
constructs. All measurement items emerged and correctly 
loaded on the corresponding constructs. All item loadings 
are greater than 0.70, and no cross loadings are greater 
than 0.40. By comparing the square root of the AVE for 
each construct with its correlations with all other 
constructs, we checked for further evidence of the 
discriminant validity of the constructs.  The square root of 
AVE for each construct was greater than the correlation 
values with other constructs. All together, the convergent 
and discriminant validity were supported.  
Measurement Model 
The measurement model was estimated by using the 
mean-adjusted maximum likelihood (MLM) method in 
Mplus. MLM adjusts the estimation for the non-normality 
in data.  As shown in Table 1, all fit indices were better 
than recommended thresholds, indicating a good fit for 
the measurement model.  
Fit Index Measurement DTI Threshold 
Normed χ2 1.31 1.61 <3.0 
CFI  0.992 0.973 >0.90 
TLI  0.990 0.970 >0.90 
RMSEA  0.027 0.037 <0.06 
SRMR  0.028 0.072 <0.10 
Table 1. Measurement and Casual Model Fit Indexes  
Model Estimation   
We used the MLM method in Mplus to estimate the DTI 
model. As shown in Table 1, all the fit indices of the DTI 
model were better than the recommended thresholds, 
indicating good model fit and supporting for our 
theoretical model.  Of the 11 hypotheses in the DTI 
model, 9 were statistically significant (Hypotheses H8 and 
H9 were not supported), confirming our theoretical 
conceptualization.  
DISCUSSION 
The experiment design and execution proved to be 
successful in manipulating participants’ perceptions about 
the detection tool, thus allowing the estimation of the 
conceptual model in order to examine how the design 
elements could change users’ perceptions and behaviors 
regarding detecting fake websites.  Our results indicated 
that users form their perception of the detector’s 
usefulness based on its accuracy, which, in turn, plays a 
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major role in forming users’ trust in the detector.  Run 
time and cost due to detector error have far smaller roles 
in users’ perception of the detector’s attributes. 
Trust in the detector emerged as the single most pivotal 
factor in linking detection tools’ design elements (H6 and 
H7) to use behaviors (H11).  Positive perception about 
detectors (usefulness) arises from detectors’ accuracy and 
has the single most profound influence on trust (path 
coefficient of 0.89, p<0.001), whereas loss due to detector 
error has a small negative influence (-0.07, p<0.01).  This 
shows that forming and promoting positive perceptions 
about detectors are critical in developing users’ trust, 
which, in turn, promotes use.  Given the fact that people 
generally are not good at detecting deceptions (Biros et al. 
2002), we believe users can substantially benefit from 
developing trust in detectors that they find useful. Our 
findings further support the importance of giving proper 
consideration to design elements (such as detection 
accuracy) that “calibrate” human trust in protective IT 
artifacts (Parasuraman and Miller 2004) to promote trust 
in and use of protective IT artifacts.  
Loss due to detector error has a small negative influence 
on trust in the detector.  Its most damaging impacts are on 
users’ self-efficacy and threat appraisal, particularly on 
threat susceptibility.  These findings indicate that the 
detector’s negative attributes, while perceived as 
contributing to threat and reducing users’ self-efficacy in 
taking security countermeasures to deal with the threat, 
may not play a significant role in user behavior so long as 
the tool is perceived as useful and, hence, trustworthy due 
to its positive design elements.   
Our results highlighted and supported numerous previous 
findings that self-efficacy is an important salient 
construct.  However, most IS studies treat self-efficacy as 
an exogenous variable and do not examine forces 
contributing to its change, either positively or negatively.  
Our work shows that detectors’ positive attributes 
increase self-efficacy (H5), and detectors’ negative 
attributes reduce self-efficacy (H3). This is an interesting 
finding since it indicates that users make a connection 
between the “ability” of an IT artifact and their own 
ability.  When perceived loss due to detector error is high, 
users lower their perception of self-efficacy (H3); when 
perceived detector usefulness is high, they increase their 
perception of self-efficacy (H5).  This is a novel finding 
since it shows that the detector has the potential to merge 
with users’ ego and to become part of their self-
perception—“I have more ability since I have a more 
powerful tool.”  This has the potential to blur the 
boundary of the self and the IT protective artifact.  
This finding becomes even more interesting when we 
consider the unexpected result for effort requirement.  
The detector’s effort requirement is another negative 
attribute.  Its impact was not as hypothesized in H4. We 
had hypothesized a negative impact on self-efficacy, 
whereas its impact turned out to be significant but 
positive.  The inconvenience of waiting for a few seconds 
and the cognitive effort of reading and deciding about the 
warning message were not an issue for users in our 
sample. Instead, the effort provided users with a sense of 
increased self-efficacy.  It seems that seeing the detector 
in operation gave users a higher sense of control and 
power in dealing with the fake website threat.  Again, the 
boundary of self and the detector becomes blurred in this 
interpretation since the effort is accepted as an ego-
enhancing process in the fight against the fraud 
perpetrated by fake websites.  This also explains why trust 
in the detector plays such an important role.  Trust by 
definition indicates a close relationship in which the 
trustor is willing to become vulnerable to the trustee’s 
actions and accept the trustee’s actions without 
verification.  It raises the question of whether protective 
IT artifacts are perceived as extensions of users’ self and 
own ability.  Does the artifact become the “Iron Man’s 
armor” to give him super power?   
Finally, we examined the DTI model with two types of 
fake website threat: spoofed and concocted.  The findings 
of the estimated model remain the same in both types of 
threat, indicating the generalizeability of the DTI model. 
IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS 
This paper makes a number of novel contributions to 
theory and practice.  First, using the theoretical lens in 
designing IT protective artifacts opens a new avenue of 
research. Second, this study addressed the call for 
research in the relationship between trust and the IT 
artifact in general and the relationship between trust and 
the detection system assisting users to detect online 
deceptions in particular (Gefen et al. 2008). Our 
investigation uncovered the pivotal role of trust in the 
artifact as the conduit between design elements and their 
eventual impacts. When designing protective IT artifacts, 
designers should give proper consideration to design 
elements regarding the trust “calibration” process 
(Parasuraman and Miller 2004).   Third, our findings 
uncovered the ways that users’ perceptions of design 
elements and artifact attributes influence their self-
efficacy by either enhancing or diminishing their sense of 
personal ability to cope with the threat of fake websites.  
Users may view protective IT artifacts as an extension of 
their self, thus reinforcing the need to combine the design 
science approach with behavioral theories to fit protective 
IT artifacts to individuals’ psychology in order to promote 
users’ trust and use. Fourth, this study contributes to 
design science research by proposing and empirically 
testing the DTI model by which design science scholars 
can test and evaluate various design elements of 
protective IT artifacts. Finally, our findings indicated that 
the main focus of research in designing protective IT 
artifacts should be on coping mechanisms and not on the 
appraisal of threat and fear.  This increases the parsimony 
of model conceptualization for designing protective IT 
artifacts.       
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This study has limitations. We collected our data for one 
context—online pharmacies.  Therefore, our results 
should be interpreted within this context. Our participants 
interacted with the detection tool stimuli that were not 
embedded in an Internet browser or running as a real-time 
system. This could be considered a limitation. However, 
our stimuli closely imitated main features of existing 
detection tools while eliminating specifics of a brand 
name. Thus, participants had a unified experiment 
platform and, consequently, variances due to participants’ 
varying experiences and knowledge of specific tools were 
removed. Further, this study was conducted with 
undergraduate and graduate students. Although 
undergraduate and graduate students represent a large 
proportion of Internet users, care must be taken in 
generalizing our findings to other populations.    
This paper is part of a larger, federally-funded project in 
this area that involves the investigation of user-interface 
elements, multiple contexts, and personalization through 
intelligent user interface.  Additionally, this paper has 
proposed a number of avenues for building theories that 
combine the strength of design science and behavioral 
science in creating compelling personalized protective IT 
artifacts.  Another direction of future research is the use 
of the DTI model in examining the design elements for 
other protective IT artifacts. Given the strong empirical 
support for the relationship between trust in the detector, 
it might be promising for future research to study how 
trust in protective IT artifacts is extended to the Internet.  
Finally, other Internet usage domains, particularly 
hedonic domains such as online games and social 
networking, could be explored in future research. It is 
possible that the impacts of the detector in hedonic 
domains will be different from those in utilitarian 
domains such as the online pharmacy employed in this 
study.   
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